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The literature supports evidence of a contagion effect, where an increase in correlations 
and price movements is observed across assets during a market downturn. This contagion effect 
can diminish the diversification expected from a portfolio’s asset allocation. There is research 
showing a connection between capital flows and contagion. This thesis considers this connection 
through a dynamic allocation strategy with allocation decisions based on capital flow 
movements. This strategy is applied to an equity-only portfolio with the objective of maintaining 
some benefits of diversification while preserving capital. In an out of sample test, a regime 
switching model is used to predict market downturns for the period from January 1998 to 
December 2018. For the predicted downturns, portfolios’ geographical allocation is altered with 
allocation changes based on the countries’ capital flows. Results from historical back tests show 
weak evidence of higher returns and similar Sharpe ratios for a dynamic strategy versus a static 
strategy for portfolios of developed market equities. The implications for portfolios of emerging 
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 There are a number of studies supporting the existence of contagion, defined as a 
significant increase in cross market correlations and price movements (volatility) during a market 
downturn. This change in correlations between assets has an impact on asset allocation decisions 
as the benefits of diversification appear to be reduced. If they are able to forecast regime shifts, 
investors might implement a dynamic asset allocation strategy to account for the changes 
incurred and mitigate some effects of contagion. There is research suggesting a connection 
between contagion and capital flow movements. These studies, reviewed in Section 2 of the 
thesis, suggest countries impacted by contagion experience a surge in capital flows prior to a 
downturn, followed by a sudden stop in flows as the downturn occurs. The research posits that 
this effect is driven by investor herding behavior that is unrelated to the fundamentals. Equipped 
with this knowledge, an investor may be able to exploit the link of contagion with capital flows 
using a dynamic asset allocation strategy. If successful, this could help preserve capital and limit 
the negative impacts on the level of diversification achieved by an equity portfolio during a 
downturn. In this thesis, I attempt to evaluate the benefits of such a strategy. 
 Many of the articles examining dynamic strategies focus on allocation decisions across 
asset classes; whereas, this study considers geographic allocation within an international equity 
portfolio. I propose a dynamic allocation strategy and test a portfolio of equities in an effort to 
lower the impact of contagion on diversification during a market downturn. To predict the 
downturns, I use a Markov regime-switching model relying on financial economic indicators. 
For the predicted downturn periods, geographical allocation decisions are based on capital flows 
data. While most research has focused on either developed or emerging markets, this study 
considers both. 
 There is some weak evidence to support the implementation of the dynamic strategy for a 
portfolio of developed market equities. Although the differences are not statistically significant, 
the results from an out of sample test covering the period from January 1998 to December 2018 
show a slightly higher return for the dynamic strategy versus the static one. 
 This study contributes to the research on contagion by examining the connection between 
capital flows and downturns and whether this information can be used to relieve the effects of 
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contagion. Making geographical allocation decisions based on capital flows helps to verify the 
importance of capital flows in the transmission of contagion across countries. As the 
transmission of contagion is typically observed through correlated movements in global equities, 
my research considers a portfolio of equities only. By analysing a portfolio of developed and 
emerging market equities, I consider how an investor can diversify within equities to reduce 
contagion risks. A focus on equities contributes to the literature on dynamic asset allocation 
which often diversifies across different classes of assets rather than within equities.  
 The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on contagion, its links to 
asset allocations and capital flows. The hypothesis is presented in section 3. Section 4 discusses 
the data and methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.1 Evidence of Contagion 
 In a study focused on the Asian crisis, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) find evidence 
supporting “no contagion, only interdependence”, suggesting correlation movements are 
proportional to expectations and that previous research on contagion contains a bias towards 
finding a contagion result due to a heteroscedasticity problem. Evidence from subsequent articles 
supports the existence of contagion when accounting for heteroscedasticity. During the Asian 
crisis (the same crisis as studied in Forbes and Rigobon), Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2005) 
find evidence of contagion from Hong Kong to five other markets (Singapore, the Philippines, 
Italy, France and the U.K.) using a single factor model of stock returns. Similarly, Chiang, Jeon 
and Li (2007) find evidence of contagion effects during the Asian crisis from examining 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted correlations and dynamic conditional correlations. Kenourgios, 
Samitas and Paltalidis (2011) find contagion from the source country using a regime switching 
Gaussian copula model and asymmetric generalized dynamic conditional correlations for three 
events occurring between 1997 and 1998 (Asian crisis, Russian crisis, and Brazilian stock market 
crash), the 2000 tech bubble, and the 2002 Brazilian crisis. Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and 
Mehl (2014) find evidence of contagion using a factor interdependence model during the global 
financial crisis of 2009. Their model shows that contagion cannot be explained by 
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interdependence alone, and must be accounted for explicitly. Boubaker, Jouini and Lahiani 
(2016) use cointegration techniques, Granger causality tests, impulse response functions and 
variance decompositions to investigate contagion during the financial crisis. Consistent with 
Bekaert et al. (2014), they find significant evidence of contagion effects between the U.S. stock 
market and other developed and emerging countries. 
2.2 Impact of Contagion on Asset Allocation Decisions 
 Investigating the impact of contagion on portfolio decisions, Das and Uppal (2004) create 
a model of international equity returns capturing sudden price swings with simultaneous 
increases in correlations. Using this model, they determine optimal portfolio weights1 and 
compare those weights to the optimal weights derived from a model without price jumps. Results 
show how the contagion effect impacts allocation decisions. Accounting for the contagion effect 
leads to different optimal allocations versus those derived when ignoring the effect. The benefits 
from diversification are slightly lowered, and there is a cost to investors’ utility from ignoring the 
effect, regardless of the level of risk aversion. The results are notably different for developed 
versus emerging markets; with a stronger impact from emerging countries attributed to larger 
swings. In a similar approach, Ang and Bekaert (2002) use a regime-switching process to 
consider dynamic asset allocation choices. This process includes a normal regime with low 
correlations and volatilities, and a bear regime with higher correlations and volatilities. Evidence 
supports distinct allocations across the two regimes. Like Das and Uppal (2004), the results show 
that investors face a cost in utility for ignoring regimes. The authors conclude there is a benefit to 
international diversification since it is not optimal to simply allocate the entire portfolio to the 
lowest volatility asset. Focusing on just three developed markets (U.S., U.K. and Germany), Das 
and Uppal find that the optimal portfolio for the bear regime contains both U.S. and German 
equities. Building on this study, Ang and Bekaert (2004) use a regime switching model out-of-
sample to exploit the regime changes through asset allocation decisions for a portfolio of 20 
developed country equities grouped into six regions. The dynamic allocation decisions enhance 
portfolio performance with the regime dependent portfolio offering a better Sharpe ratio than 
both the market capitalization weighted portfolio and the non-regime dependent portfolio. The 
 
1 Appendix A compares the methods used to determine allocation weights in each study. 
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authors again conclude that the benefits of international diversification are not entirely lost 
during the bear regime, given that the optimal allocation includes several regions.  
 Work by Hauptmann, Hoppenkamps, Min, Ramsauer and Zagst (2014) and Kritzman, 
Page and Turkington (2012) also rely on Markov-switching regime models to predict regimes 
and adjust asset allocations accordingly. In both cases, the dynamic allocation decisions based on 
the regime shifts outperform a static strategy although more than just equity assets are 
considered. Solnik and Watewai (2016) also demonstrate the importance of accounting for the 
asymmetric characteristics of contagion in asset allocation decisions by incorporating diffusion 
and jumps with regime switching. Optimizing the portfolio allocation based on information from 
the model improves diversification and results in a higher Sharpe ratio.  
2.3 Contagion and Capital Flows 
 There is research showing a connection between large capital flow movements and the 
high volatility periods typically associated with contagion. Fratzscher (2012), Rey (2015) and 
Forbes and Warnock (2012) establish a connection between capital flows and global factors, 
suggesting that capital flow movements are driven by global changes in risk. Fratzscher (2012) 
finds that movements in capital flows during the global financial crisis can be attributed to global 
factors, such as liquidity and risk. Rising risk results in a retrenchment of flows to emerging 
countries. Rey (2015) observes strong cyclicality in capital flows, pointing out the increasing 
importance of capital movements due to globalisation. Her analysis finds evidence of an 
important correlation between capital flows and market uncertainty, as measured by the VIX. 
When volatility is low, there are surges in gross capital flows and when volatility increases, 
capital flows are significantly smaller. Forbes and Warnock (2012) make a direct connection 
between capital flows and contagion. Looking at extreme movements in capital flows (where 
among other criteria, flows must be more than two standard deviations above or below a 
historical mean), these authors determine that contagion and increases in global risk explain 
extreme capital movements. More specifically, contagion and elevated risk are linked to “stops” 
(lower gross capital inflows) and “retrenchments” (lower gross capital outflows). Both of these 
types of extreme capital flow movements were common during the global financial crisis. 
 Interestingly, all three studies make the observation that the receipt of large capital flows 
by a country before a crisis can be an indicator for poor performance during the crisis. Fratzscher 
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(2012) finds that although countries with riskier fundamentals experienced larger capital 
outflows during the crisis, they also had higher inflows before the crisis, and during the recovery. 
Rey (2015) asserts that markets having greater credit flows are more likely to be affected by the 
global cycle and that significant credit growth during low volatility times is a good indicator for 
a crisis. Data on extreme capital flow events from Forbes and Warnock (2012) show that sudden 
surges tend to precede events that lead to sudden stops. Surges were observed before the 
Mexican crisis, the Asian crisis and the global financial crises. Both the Mexican crisis and the 
global financial crisis were followed by a stop in capital flows while the Asian crisis fell just 
short of meeting Forbes and Warnock’s (2012) criteria to be labelled a stop.  
 Historical examples of a surge in capital inflows prior to a contagion event are provided 
by Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003) as they investigate why some crises result in contagion. 
The authors consider four crises with contagion from the early 1990s (European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism crisis, Mexican crisis, Asian crisis and Russian crisis). These events experienced 
capital flow bubbles before the shock, and abrupt reversals leading to lower capital flows 
thereafter. Contrarily, shocks occurring in the following years (Brazilian devaluation in 1999, 
Turkish devaluation and Argentinian default in 2001) when capital flows remained low, did not 
result in contagion. Additionally, the reversal of capital flows into Latin America following 
Mexico’s default in 1982 is cited as a reason why shocks in the following years experienced 
limited to no contagion effects. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh’s work concludes that capital flow 
movements are an important element for the occurrence of contagion. 
 Some evidence points to international investors as the drivers of the extreme capital flow 
movements leading to contagion. Using a mathematical model and an empirical example, Calvo 
and Mendoza (2000) demonstrate how globalization increases contagion by lowering investors’ 
incentives to collect information and encouraging them to all hold a market portfolio. The 
example shows how tracking error and fixed costs of obtaining information are significant in 
inducing large capital outflows unrelated to specific country fundamentals. Boyer, Kumagai and 
Yuan (2006) investigate accessible and inaccessible markets during the 1997 Asian crisis where 
accessible markets are those available to foreign investors. Results show that the behavior of 
international investors influences contagion. Increases in correlations are more pronounced for 
accessible stocks and the effects on inaccessible stocks tend to lag accessible stocks. This 
supports the idea that crises spread first to accessible markets via foreign investor flows. Boyer 
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makes the argument that movements in capital are not related to fundamentals but rather driven 
by asset holdings of international investors. Focusing on Latin America and the Mexican crisis, 
Calvo and Reinhart (1996) find that capital flows to larger, more developed and more open 
economies influence the flows to the surrounding, smaller economy countries and that countries 
whose equity markets are less accessible to foreign investors tend to be more shielded from 
crisis. Tong and Wei (2011) investigate how the volume and composition of capital flows affects 
the performance of manufacturing firms in emerging markets during the Global Financial crisis. 
Their findings show that firms having a stronger dependence on capital flows in the form of bank 
lending and portfolio flows tend to experience worse outcomes during the crisis; while firms 
with exposures to foreign direct investment flows are more insulated.  
3. HYPOTHESIS 
I hypothesize that the impact of contagion and its effect on diversification can be mitigated 
through a dynamic asset allocation strategy. With contagion being related to large capital flow 
movements, seemingly driven by investor behavior and unrelated to fundamentals, it can be 
expected that countries with capital flow surges would experience a sudden pull back on those 
flows during a downturn. There is evidence that these stops and retrenchments are cyclically 
related to global risk. As such, when uncertainty rises (as in a downturn), countries experiencing 
reduced capital flows are more likely to suffer contagion. Implementing a dynamic asset 
allocation strategy during a downturn, and basing the allocation decisions on capital flow 
movements should account for this contagion effect and help to mitigate it. Having regard for 
this, investors may potentially limit their exposure to the contagion effect through improved 
diversification and preservation of capital. This leads to the following hypothesis in its 
alternative form: 
HA: Implementing a dynamic asset allocation strategy based on countries’ capital flow 
movements leads to better diversification and conservation of capital during a downturn for a 
portfolio of international equities. 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The first step in testing my hypothesis is to predict market downturns. To do this, I use a 
two regime Markov-switching model inspired by Page, Kritzman and Turkington (2012). 
Markov-switching models are very commonly used for predicting changes in regime and the 
method employed by Kritzman et al (2012) is straightforward for working with historical data. 
The method applies the Baum-Welch algorithm, making use of the forward backward algorithm, 
to determine the probability of being in a given regime for each data observation. It is an iterative 
process converging to a maximum likelihood where the estimated regime probabilities best fit 
the observed data. In this study, the observed data are the OECD CLI. I programmed the model 
in Matlab, assuming two regimes. The first iteration relies on assumptions for the initial 
parameter values.2 With these initial assumptions, I use the smoothing forward-backward 
algorithm to estimate the expectation of being in regime 1 or regime 2 for each observation. The 
forward and backward probability estimates account for past and future data observations 
(respectively) as well as the transition probabilities.  For example, the forward probability of 
being in regime 1 for a given observation uses information from the previous observation and 
sums the probabilities of the two possible paths from this observation. That is, the probability of 
the previous observation having been in regime 1 and transitioning to regime 1 plus the 
probability of the previous iteration having been in regime 2 and transitioning to regime 1. This 
sum is then multiplied by the probability that the current observation is in regime 1. Backward 
probabilities are estimated in much the same way but rely on information from the future 
observations instead. The forward and backward probabilities are then smoothed by multiplying 
them together. All possible paths are accounted for using this algorithm. From these calculations, 
there is sufficient information to obtain new estimates for the parameter values of the initial 
probability of being in regime 1, the mean and standard deviation of each regime and the 
transition matrix. I use these newly estimated parameter values to repeat the process and 
calculate new expectations. At each iteration, a likelihood value3 is calculated. The process is 
repeated as long as the difference in likelihoods across two iterations is greater than a threshold 
value of 0.00001. When the change in likelihood becomes less than 0.00001, the method 
 
2 See Appendix B for assumed values. 
3 The likelihood is calculated with the sum of the forward probabilities. 
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converges and the likelihood is considered maximized. The resulting regime probabilities are the 
best fit for the observed data. 
As mentioned, the observed data for this thesis are Composite leading indicators (CLI), 
published monthly4 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
CLI are designed to signal turning points in the business cycle. They are composed of economic 
variables that mimic the fluctuations in economic activity but precede the timing of those 
fluctuations. I use global and United States CLI to make two sets of regime predictions. The 
global CLI accounts for the 35 OECD member countries and 6 other countries (Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa). While the global CLI considers more countries, the 
U.S. CLI provides a longer history for the probability estimates, with data starting from January 
1955 compared to November 1973 for the global CLI. I fit the model using the respective 
histories available for the U.S. CLI and global CLI up to December 1997. For each month going 
forward, the probability of being in regime 1 or regime 2 is estimated by re-calibrating the model 
with the growing range of data. These are the out of sample regime predictions (Tables 3 and 4), 
covering the period from January 19985 to December 2018. A downturn is identified when the 
probability of being in the downturn regime becomes greater than 60%6 and ends on the month 
that the probability moves back below 60%. I employ a two-month lag in order to align with the 
actual publication timing of the OECD CLI data. The regimes are classified according to their 
means and volatilities, with the downturn regime characterized by a lower mean CLI value and 
higher volatility. The next section discusses the results of the predicted downturns. 
I use the countries from the MSCI World and Emerging Market (EM) indices for my 
analysis. Their inclusion in the portfolio depends on the history of capital account data available. 
Of the 23 countries currently in the MSCI World Index, 17 countries have a complete data time 
series dating back to 1998. Eleven out of the 24 countries currently in the MSCI EM index have 
a 20-year history of capital flows. Table 1 lists the countries included in the portfolios. MSCI 
 
4 CLI data are published with a 2-month lag; e.g. the CLI number for January is only published in the month of 
March.  
5 Other out of sample starting points were considered, January 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999 with little impact on the 
results. January 1998 was selected to avoid the issue of being in a downturn while moving from the in sample to 
the out of sample predictions. This provides a 20 year period for out of sample testing. 
6 Thresholds of 50% and 70% were also tested with little impact on results. 
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individual country indices are used for calculating portfolio returns. For those countries included 
in the portfolio, I calculate the returns using the MSCI individual country index returns 
multiplied by their corresponding market cap weights. 
During the months where the probability of a downturn is less than 60%, each country’s 
weight is equal to its beginning-of-the-month MSCI market cap7 divided by the total market cap 
of the countries included in the portfolio. In months where a downturn is predicted, I apply 
changes to the geographical allocation of the equity portfolio. These changes remain in effect for 
the duration of the downturn with a one month lag.8 These changes consist of reducing the 
weights for countries with capital flow surges during the predicted downturn periods. I define a 
capital flow surge according to criteria used by Forbes and Warnock (2012). A country is 
classified as having a surge in capital flows if, for the quarter corresponding to the first month of 
a predicted downturn, the year over year difference in capital flows is more than one standard 
deviation above the 5-year historical mean. Reducing the allocation for countries with capital 
flow surges is a defensive strategy based on my hypothesis that countries experiencing surges in 
their capital flows often experience lower returns during a downturn as these large flows, 
unrelated to fundamentals, are expected to halt. To test this hypothesis, I employ allocation 
reductions of 60% relative to the market cap weights. The 60% reduction is an arbitrary decision 
for illustrative purposes. Other reduction proportions were tested and the results were found to be 
aligned pro rata. The difference from the underweight is redistributed equally across the 
remaining countries in the portfolio. I calculate the portfolio returns by taking the weighted sum 
of the country allocations and their respective MSCI country index returns.  To observe the 
impact of the defensive allocation changes, the portfolio returns with the reduced allocations are 
compared to portfolio returns with the MSCI country market cap weights (Tables 7 and 8). 
  
 
7 According to its MSCI Country Index 
8 A one-month lag is used since implementation of the allocation changes is not simultaneous with prediction of the 
downturn. Allocation changes occur in the month following the predicted start of the downturn and end one month 
after the predicted end of the downturn. 
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5. RESULTS 
The in-sample parameter estimates for the two regimes are presented in Table 2. For both 
the global and U.S. CLI predictions, the regime having the lower mean and higher volatility is 
the downturn regime. The global CLI downturn regime has an average CLI value of 99.3 with a 
volatility of 0.83 compared to 100.7 and 0.40 for the normal regime. For the U.S. CLI estimates, 
the mean is 98.5 for the downturn regime with a volatility of 1.00 versus a 100.8 mean and 0.82 
volatility for the normal regime. There is a high level of persistence present in both of the 
regimes, consistent with the idea that once in a regime, one is likely to remain there. The 
standard errors of the parameters show the mean and standard deviation to be significantly 
different across the two regimes. The persistence variables are also statistically significant. 
To obtain the out of sample probability estimates, I re-calibrate the model for each 
monthly CLI value from January 1998 to December 2018. For each month’s CLI value, the 
model estimates the probability of being in the downturn regime or the normal regime. A month 
is considered to be in the downturn regime when its probability is greater than 60%. The out of 
sample downturn predictions are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The model predicts five downturn 
regimes using the global CLI and four using the U.S. CLI. The first downturn forecast from the 
global CLI occurs between May 1998 and July 1999, which corresponds to the Russian default 
crisis and the Long Term Capital Management crisis. No downturn related to this period is 
predicted by the U.S. CLI. Downturn 2 from March 2001 to January 2004, is aligned with the 
tech bubble and is consistent with the first downturn predicted using the U.S. CLI (downturn A, 
February 2001 to December 2003). Downturns 3 and 5 from the global CLI (starting in August 
2008 and March 2016, respectively) have similar starting points as second and fourth downturns 
(B and D) from the U.S. CLI (starting dates of October 2008 and February 2016), but with 
different ending points. For the downturns related to the global financial crisis (3 and B), global 
CLI predictions have a duration of 19 months compared to a 28-month duration from the U.S. 
CLI predictions. The longer duration from the U.S. CLI could be because the global financial 
crisis was U.S. centric. Downturn 5 closely follows the 2015 drop in crude oil prices. It is 
anticipated to end 7 months earlier than the corresponding downturn D predicted from U.S. CLI. 
The timing of downturns 4 and C are aligned with the 2013 taper tantrum where substantial 
volatility in U.S. bond yields spilled over to global stock markets. The U.S. CLI downturn C is 
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expected to end before the global CLI predicted downturn 4 even begins and it has a shorter 
duration (7 months versus 16 months). The longer duration for the global CLI prediction may be 
explained by the considerable spillover effect felt by countries outside the U.S. (notably 
emerging markets); while the U.S. recovered quite rapidly. 
Compared with the actual CLI turning points as provided by the OECD (Figures 1 and 2), 
the out of sample downturns predicted from my model capture each of the peak to trough events 
in the actual CLI turning points (5 events for the global CLI, 4 for the U.S.). The durations of the 
predicted downturns are also consistent. Downturn C from the U.S. CLI predictions is the 
exception to the late timing as it predicts a downturn before the actual OECD turning point. 
Comparing predicted downturns to returns for the MSCI World and Emerging Market Indices 
(Tables 3 and 4) also shows a lag present relative to market movements. For the predictions from 
the global CLI, a noteworthy portion of the drawdown in equities is captured in downturns 1, 2 
and 3; but downturns 4 and 5 start late, mostly capturing the rise in equity prices. From the U.S. 
CLI downturn predictions, the decline in equities is captured in downturns A, B and C, but the 
last downturn from this series also coincides more with the recovery. The duration of each of the 
predicted downturns often encompasses the start of the recovery for market returns. This is 
reflected in the mostly positive static portfolios returns for each of the downturn periods (Tables 
7 and 8). While this method may predict a downturn in a timely manner, it appears less optimal 
for predicting the start of the recovery.  
The in sample global and U.S. CLI predictions also exhibit lagged results compared to the 
actual CLI turning points (Figures 3 and 4). Two of the actual U.S. turning points are not 
captured by the in sample U.S. downturn predictions. These two instances refer to flash crashes 
with relatively shorter term economic impacts. The influence of such events is likely lessened by 
the smoothing feature of the forward backward algorithm used in predicting downturns. U.S. CLI 
also have a longer history available compared to the global CLI, which can also reinforce the 
smoothing issue for the U.S. in sample predictions relative to the global CLI predictions. The 
global CLI in sample predicted downturns capture all of the peak to trough events as reported in 
the actual turning points for global CLI.  
The countries experiencing a capital flow surge during the predicted downturns are listed 
in Tables 5 and 6. Their weights in the portfolio are reduced for the duration of the downturn. 
Due to a lack of historical data, the emerging market countries are excluded from the analysis of 
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downturn 1. I apply the underweights only during the predicted downturn months. For all other 
months, a country’s weight is its market cap proportion from its respective MSCI index.9 The 
Dynamic portfolio refers to the portfolio with the underweighted country allocations. The Static 
portfolio uses the proportional market cap weights for the full period.  
Out of sample results for the Dynamic and Static portfolios are shown in Tables 7 and 8. 
Although the differences in return and volatility are not found to be statistically significant across 
the two portfolios (Tables 9 and 10), the historical out of sample test shows instances where the 
dynamic portfolio helps preserve capital. For both global and U.S. CLI predicted downturns, the 
Dynamic portfolio has a higher annualized return than the Static portfolio over the full out of 
sample period for the developed markets. The Dynamic portfolio also has lower volatility and a 
higher Sharpe ratio. While the Dynamic portfolio does not have a higher return over the full 
period for the emerging market countries, it does have a lower volatility and a better maximum 
drawdown10. Results are similar for the individual downturn periods. For the downturn 
predictions from the global CLI, the Dynamic portfolio has a higher return in four out of the five 
downturns11 for the developed markets but in only one of the downturns for the emerging 
markets. The largest positive difference occurs in Downturn 2 for the developed markets. This 
downturn is aligned with the tech bubble. For this period, the Dynamic portfolio yields an 
annualized return of 2.56% with a volatility of 16.30%, compared to a 0.86% return and a 
16.91% volatility for the Static portfolio. The dynamic portfolio also has a higher Sharpe ratio 
(0.13 versus 0.03) and improved maximum drawdown (-33.19% vs. -34.92%). For the emerging 
market countries, the Dynamic portfolio has a marginally higher annualized return (1.41% vs. 
1.26%) only during the global financial crisis (downturn 3). The standard deviation and Sharpe 
ratio are near equal. However, Downturn 1 is excluded from the emerging markets analysis12 and 
no weight changes are applied in Downturn 4. For the out of sample results from the U.S. CLI 
estimates, the developed markets Dynamic portfolio has a higher mean return in 3 of the 4 
 
9 In downturns 4 and C, none of the emerging market countries were experiencing capital flow surges so the EM 
portfolio weights remain unchanged from the market cap for these downturns. 
10 Maximum drawdown is the greatest loss from a peak to a trough before a new peak is attained. 
11 Special case for downturn 3 returns are nearly equal, the dynamic portfolio outperforms by 0.004%. 
12 Downturn 1 is excluded for the emerging markets as there is not sufficient data to calculate the 5-year historical 
mean of the capital flow changes. 
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downturns. The maximum drawdown is improved for those same three downturns (A, C and D) 
and the volatility of the Dynamic portfolio is lower in all cases. Once again, the downturn related 
to the tech bubble (downturn A) has the strongest relative performance for the Dynamic 
portfolio, earning an annualized return of -0.40% and a standard deviation of 16.68% compared 
to a -1.97% return and 17.44% volatility for the Static portfolio. Results for the emerging 
markets are less favorable. The dynamic portfolio has a lower annualized return for each of the 
U.S. CLI predicted downturns. Since, none of the countries for downturn C is in a capital flow 
surge, the dynamic and static portfolios hold the same weights over the period.  This is a contrast 
to results for the global CLI predictions where the dynamic strategy did have a higher annualized 
return for the emerging market portfolio during the global financial crisis downturn. The result is 
not reproduced for the U.S. CLI global financial crisis downturn, downturn B, likely because the 
length of the downturn captures the start of the recovery. Downturn B lasts 28 months while 
downturn 3 is 19 months long. As previously mentioned, because the global financial crisis was 
U.S. centric, it is possible the global CLI predicts a shorter downturn regime due to an earlier 
recovery for some of the countries in its composition.  
With the observed p-values, I fail to reject that the returns or volatilities are equal across 
the two portfolios for all the out of sample results (Table 9). I find only the Sharpe ratios for the 
developed market portfolios in downturns 5 and C and the emerging market portfolio for the full 
period from global CLI to be significantly different. This is likely explained by the minor weight 
changes applied to the countries. Depending on the original weight the surge country has in the 
index, the reduced allocation could have little impact. There are also few countries deemed to 
have capital flow surges and thus having reductions to their allocations. For the small sample of 
emerging countries, there are even fewer weight changes which could explain the weaker 
dynamic portfolio performances observed for the emerging markets relative to the developed 
markets. 
6. CONCLUSION  
This thesis finds that a dynamic asset allocation strategy based on capital flows provides 
some performance benefits for the portfolio of developed market equities. Although the 
differences in returns are not statistically significant across the two portfolios for any of the 
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downturns, the out of sample tests with the global CLI show that for the developed countries, 
implementing the Dynamic portfolio would have yielded higher returns over the full period and 
in four out of five predicted downturns. The Sharpe ratios are at least as high as that of the Static 
portfolio and the Sharpe ratio is statistically higher for Downturn 5. For the out of sample U.S. 
predictions, the Dynamic portfolio yields a higher annualized return over the full period and in 
three out of the four predicted downturns and the Sharpe ratio is improved for all downturns. For 
the emerging markets, the Dynamic portfolio return is only higher for downturn 3, the Global 
financial crisis. This suggests that capital flows might be more informative for developed 
countries.  
The limited weight changes applied in the model used in this thesis might explain why the 
differences in results are not statistically significant across the two portfolios. Few countries are 
defined as having capital flow surges; especially in the emerging markets. This means that the 
portfolio weights of the dynamic and static strategies may not be substantially different. Using a 
different measure of capital flows, or adjusting the criteria for defining a surge could have an 
impact on the number of countries selected for underweighting, which, in turn, could affect the 
significance of the results. Data availability is a considerable challenge for emerging markets. Of 
the 24 countries in the MSCI EM index, only eleven had a long enough history of capital flow 
data for the analysis conducted in this thesis. This gives a smaller initial set of emerging market 
countries considered for reduced allocation which could also contribute to why the developed 
markets portfolio allocations show stronger results. 
Although the regime predicting methodology does a reasonable job at capturing the peaks 
and troughs of the actual CLI data, there is a visible lag in the predictions. The choice of the 
global and U.S. CLI as the input data for the predictions may influence this. Although the global 
CLI accounts for some emerging countries, it is mostly composed of information regarding 
developed countries. Using CLI from the emerging countries that make up the portfolio could be 
a more accurate reflection of the economic state of those countries, leading to improved 
downturn predictions. It is also important to note that the results for the developed markets are 
stronger for the downturns predicted with the U.S. CLI. This could be attributed to the U.S. 
economy being a driver of the global economy and thus a better predictor of market downturns 
for developed countries. Returns for both the developed and emerging markets portfolios might 
improve with a more accurate prediction of downturns. 
 15 
Overall, the analysis presented in this thesis provides some evidence to support the 
implementation of a dynamic allocation strategy with allocation decisions based on capital flow 
movements. In out of sample testing, the dynamic strategy was shown to improve diversification 
and preservation of capital for a developed markets portfolio in the form of improved returns, 
Sharpe ratios and lower volatility for some of the predicted downturns. Improvements could be 
made to the systematic process for deciding allocation changes (e.g. a different threshold for 
determining capital flow surges or an allocation reduction relative to a country’s level of capital 
flows) in order to possibly enrich the results. Further research with more extensive data is 
warranted to better evaluate the effects for emerging markets.   
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Appendix A: Process for allocation decisions from the literature 
 
Ang and Bekaert (2002) 
 
Consider a U.S. Investor looking to maximize end of period utility through a monthly 
rebalancing of a portfolio of equities and risk-free assets. Solve for the optimal portfolio 
weights for each month, maximizing the constant relative risk aversion utility. Optimization 
accounts for the regime in the current month and the transition probabilities to other regimes. 
 
 
Ang and Bekaert (2004) 
 
Use mean-variance optimization, rebalanced monthly to determine portfolio weights. Inputs 
for optimization problem are dependent on the on regime at the given time. 
 
 
Das and Uppal (2004) – Systemic Risk and International Portfolio Choice 
 
Determine an investor’s optimal portfolio weights based on their jump diffusion model of 
returns. A stochastic dynamic program is used to determine the pricing of the assets. The 
perspective of a U.S. investor seeking to maximize the expected utility at terminal wealth is 
considered. Find the weights for a risk-free asset, U.S. equities and foreign equities that 
maximize terminal wealth for three different levels of risk aversion. 
 
 
Hauptmann et al. (2014) 
 
Considers a stock bond portfolio composed of a risk-free asset and U.S equities. Employ rules-
based allocation decisions for two different strategies. For strategy A, when the model predicts 
a bad regime for a given month, invest in the risk-free asset, otherwise invest in the S&P 500 
index. For Strategy B, if a month is predicted to be in a calm regime, the probability of being 
in the calm regime serves as the allocation to the S&P 500 index. If the month is expected to 
be in a turbulent regime, the probability of being in the negative turbulent regime (having 
mainly negative returns) is the allocation weight for the risk-free asset (the turbulent regime is 





Kritzman, Page and Turkington (2012) 
 
Considers a portfolio through the lens of risk premiums. Given an initial exposure to the risk 
premiums, the investor implements “defensive tilts” for the months when an event regime is 
predicted. The tilts reflect reduced allocation to certain risk premiums or addition allocation to 
defensive trades. Different tilts are employed, depending on the type of even regime predicted. 
The values assigned to the defensive tilts are arbitrary and used for illustrative purposes. Table 
2 for the tilts. 
 
 
Solnik and Watewai (2016) 
 
Consider a U.S. investor with constant relative risk aversion, seeking to maximize terminal 
wealth. Solve for the optimal portfolio weights across regional equities and a risk-free asset. 
At a given time, the investor has knowledge of previous asset returns and wealth, but not of 





Appendix B: Baum-Welch Algorithm Initial Parameter Values 
 
I assume the initial probability of being in regime 1 is 0.5, which means that the initial 
probability of being in regime 2 is also 0.5. The probability of observing the data while in regime 
1 is assumed to follow the probability density function of the Normal distribution13 with mean 
and standard deviation equal to the mean and standard deviation of the CLI data. The probability 
of observing the data while in regime 2 assumes a Normal distribution with a higher mean, equal 
to the average of the CLI data plus 1.5 standard deviations (where the standard deviation is that 
of the CLI data). The transmission matrix assumptions are a 0.8 probability of remaining in the 
same regime and a 0.2 probability of switching.   
 







Appendix C: Data and Results 
Table 1: List of countries included in the portfolio 
The countries included in the developed market and emerging market portfolios are those in the MSCI 
World and MSCI Emerging Market indices with at least a 20-year history (December 2018 to December 
1998) of capital flow data. Source refers to the source of the capital flow data. 
Developed Countries   Emerging Markets 





Australia OECD   Brazil OECD 
Austria IMF   China OECD 
Canada OECD   Czech Republic OECD 
Denmark OECD   Greece IMF 
Finland OECD   Hungary IMF 
France OECD   Korea IMF 
Germany OECD   Mexico IMF/Datastream 
Italy OECD   Peru IMF 
Japan OECD   Philippines IMF 
Netherlands OECD   Russia IMF 
New Zealand IMF   South Africa OECD 
Norway OECD       
Portugal OECD       
Spain OECD       
Sweden OECD       
United Kingdom OECD       




Table 2: In sample regime switching model parameters 
The in-sample parameter estimates and their standard errors for the regime switching model. The mean 
and standard deviation are the mean and standard deviation of the CLI for the specified regime. 
Persistence refers to the probability of remaining in the same regime. The beginning in-sample period for 
global CLI estimates is from November 1973 to December 1997. The beginning in-sample period for the 
U.S. CLI based estimates is from January 1955 to December 1997. The parameter estimates are obtained 
using the Baum-Welch algorithm. The standard errors are calculated from the covariance matrix as 
derived from the information matrix of the log-likelihood function.  
 GLOBAL CLI REGIMES U.S. CLI REGIMES 







































Table 3: Out of sample predicted downturn regimes from global CLI 
The start, end and duration of the downturns predicted from the regime switching model based on global 
CLI are presented in this table along with annualized returns for the MSCI World and MSCI EM indices 
for the respective periods. A downturn starts in the month when the probability of being in the downturn 
regime is greater than 60% and ends when the probability of being in the downturn regime moves below 
60%. 






Downturn 1 May-98 Jul-99 15 months 12.64% 19.79% 
Downturn 2 Mar-01 Jan-04 35 months 0.24%  15.58% 
Downturn 3 Aug-08 Feb-10 19 months -6.92% 3.54% 
Downturn 4 May-12 Sep-13 17 months 24.31% 9.78% 




Table 4: Out of sample predicted downturn regimes from U.S. CLI 
The start, end and duration of the downturns predicted from the regime switching model based on the 
U.S. CLI are presented in this table, along with the annualized returns for the MSCI World and MSCI EM 
indices for the respective periods. A downturn starts in the month when the probability of being in the 
downturn regime is greater than 60% and ends when the probability of being in the downturn regime 
moves below 60% 
Predicted 
Downturn 






Downturn A Feb-01 Dec-03 35 months -2.65%   9.70% 
Downturn B Oct-08 Jan-11 28 months 15.94%   32.89% 
Downturn C Oct-11 Apr-12 7 months  -5.52%  -14.87% 
Downturn D Feb-16 Jul-17 18 months  17.07% 29.24%  
 
Table 5: Countries to be underweighted (global CLI downturns) 
The countries underweighted during the downturns predicted from global CLI are reported in this table. A 
country is underweighted if there is a surge in its capital flows at the start of the downturn. A surge is 
defined as a year over year difference in capital flows that is more than one standard deviation above its 
5-year historical average difference. 
Downturn 1 Downturn 2 Downturn 3 Downturn 4 Downturn 5 
Jun 1998 - Jun 1999 Mar 2001 - Jan 2004 Aug 2008 - Feb 2010 Jun 2012 - Sept 2013 Mar 2016 - Jan 2017 
Developed Market Countries 
Netherlands Germany Spain Italy Italy 
  
Netherlands   Japan United Kingdom 
United States       
Emerging Market Countries 
  Russia Czech Republic   Brazil 
        Russia 
 
Table 6: Countries to be underweighted (U.S. CLI downturns) 
The countries underweighted during the downturns predicted from U.S. CLI are reported in this table. A 
country is underweighted if there is a surge in its capital flows at the start of the downturn. A surge is 
defined as a year over year difference in capital flows that is more than one standard deviation above its 
5-year historical average difference. 
Downturn A Downturn B Downturn C Downturn D 
Feb 2001 - Dec 2003 Oct 2008 - Jan 2011 Oct 2011 - Apr 2012 Feb 2016 - Jul 2017 
Developed Market Countries 
Germany Canada Canada Italy 
Netherlands Netherlands Denmark United Kingdom 
United States   Japan   
Emerging Market Countries 
Russia Russia   Brazil 
      Russia 
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Table 7: Risk and return results for the static and dynamic portfolios (global predicted downturns) 
Annualised returns, standard deviations, Sharpe ratios and Maximum drawdowns based on monthly data in USD are reported in this table. Results 
are presented with a one-month lag relative to the downturn period (as estimated by the global CLI) in order to account for implementation of the 
weight changes. Returns are calculated from the monthly data for market capitalizations and returns from the MSCI country indexes. The Sharpe 
ratio is based on the U.S. risk free rate. The Maximum drawdown measures the worst peak to trough loss incurred before returning to a new peak.  
 
 
Table 8: Risk and return results for the static and dynamic portfolios (U.S. CLI predicted downturns) 
Annualised return, standard deviation, Sharpe ratio and Maximum drawdown based on monthly data in USD are reported in this table. Results 
presented with a one-month lag relative to the downturn period (as estimated by U.S. CLI) in order to account for implementation of the weight 
changes. Returns are calculated from the monthly data for market capitalizations and returns from the MSCI country indexes. The Sharpe ratio is 




Table 9: Statistical significance for differences in returns, variances and Sharpe ratios for the static and dynamic portfolios 
(global predicted downturns) 
This table reports the p-values for two sample tests of differences in mean returns (z-test) and for two sample tests of differences in variances (F-
test). The type I error level (𝛂) required for the difference in Sharpe ratios to be significant is presented in the final column. This 𝛂 is 
estimated using the Jobson-Korkie test for equal Sharpe ratios. * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 10: Statistical significance for differences in returns, variances and Sharpe ratios for the static and dynamic portfolios 
(U.S. predicted downturns) 
This table reports the p-values for two sample tests of differences in mean returns (z-test) and for two sample tests of differences in variances (F-
test). The type I error level (𝛂) required for the difference in Sharpe ratios to be significant is presented in the final column. This 𝛂 is 




Figure 1: Out of sample global CLI predicted downturns vs. actual global CLI turning 
points 
This figure compares the out of sample downturn predictions obtained from the regime switching model 
with global CLI to the actual turning points of the global CLI as obtained from the OECD. 
 
 
Figure 2: Out of sample U.S. CLI predicted downturns vs. actual U.S. CLI turning points 
This figure compares the out of sample downturn predictions obtained from the regime switching model 
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Figure 3: In sample global CLI predicted downturns vs. actual global CLI turning points 
This figure compares the in sample downturn predictions obtained from the regime switching model with 
global CLI to the actual turning points of the global CLI as obtained from the OECD.  
 
 
Figure 4: In sample U.S. CLI predicted downturns vs. actual U.S. CLI turning points 
This figure compares the in sample downturn predictions obtained from the regime switching model with 
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